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Article 2

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
MORTGAGEE'S RIGHTS IN THE EVENT
OF A DEFICIENCY
By JESSE

SLINGLUFF, JR.*

When a mortgage is foreclosed in Maryland and the net
proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the property are insufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt and interest after
the payment of the expenses of the foreclosure and other
proper charges a mortgagee or his assignee has certain
rights to collect this deficiency. These rights may exist
against the mortgagor or mortgagors, a guarantor or guarantors of the mortgage debt, if such exist, and a grantee or
grantees of the mortgagor, if any there be.'
The rights of an assignee of a mortgagee and those of
a mortgagee are ordinarily identical, as it is expressly so
provided in the usual mortgage. If it is so provided, then
the statutes giving the mortgagee equitable remedies likewise give these remedies to assignees.2 Therefore, when
a mortgagee's rights are discussed, the discussion is equally
applicable to the rights of an assignee of a mortgage.
I
RIGHTS OF A MORTGAGEE AGAINST A MORTGAGOR
FOR A DEFICIENCY

When There Has Been No Assignment by the Mortgagor
As a general rule a mortgagee has three remedies in
personam against a mortgagor in case of a deficiency in
a foreclosure sale: (1) the statutory right to a deficiency
decree; (2) an action at law on the covenants in the mort* Of the Baltimore City bar. A.B., 1926, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B.,
1930, Harvard Law School.
2 This article does not deal with rights in personam against a defaulting
purchaser at foreclosure sale for which see Md. Code, Art. 16, See. 239,
and Md. Code Supp., Art. 16, Sec. 239 and the cases cited thereunder, particularly: Mercantile Bank v. Md. Title Guarantee Co., 153 Md. 320, 138
AtI. 251 (1927) ; Bilbrey v. Strahorn, 153 Md. 491, 138 Atl. 343 (1927);
Miller v. Mitnick, 163 Md. 113, 161 Atl. 157 (1932).
2 This applies equally to an assignee of all the mortgagee's right, title
and interest as well as to an assignee for the purpose of foreclosure. Md.
Code, Art. 66, Sees. 6-24; Md. Code of Public Local Laws, Flack's 1930
Ed., Art. 4, Sec. 720.
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gage; (3) an action at law in assumpsit. These remedies
are cumulative and either one or all may be pursued until
satisfaction of the debt is had.'
The first remedy above is given by three separate statutes. Which of these three statutes is applicable to a particular case depends on the method of foreclosure a mortgagee selects. If the foreclosure is an ordinary equity
foreclosure, which procedure may be followed in Baltimore City and any county of the State, the right of a mort4
gagee to a deficiency decree is set forth by the Code. If
the foreclosure is under a power contained in the mortgage, which procedure is also State-wide, then the right
to a deficiency decree is given by another code provision.5
If the foreclosure is by a consent decree, as provided for
solely in Baltimore City, then the right to a deficiency decree is given by a local law in the City Charter.' These
three statutes are almost identical in language and have
been held similar in meaning,7 and it will suffice to quote
in the footnote the provisions of the City Charter referred
to above."
If the mortgage is under seal, then, under the above statutes, a mortgagee may procure a deficiency decree in Equity
3Commercial Bldg. Assn. v. Robinson, 90 Md. 615, 632, 45 AtI. 449 (1900) ;
Wilhelm v. See, 2 Md. Ch. 322 (1849) ; Andrews v. Scotten, 2 Bland Ch.
629, 665 (1830).
' Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 232.
5 Md. Code, Art. 66, Sec. 6-38, particularly Sec. 24.
8 Code of Public Local Laws (Flack's 1930 Ed.) Art. 4, Sees. 720-732-A,
particularly Sec. 731-A.
7McDonald v. Building Assoc'n., 60 Md. 589 (1883) ; Kushnick v. Bldg.
& Loan Assn., 153 Md. 638, 644, 139 AtI. 446 (1927).
8 "If, upon a sale of the whole mortgaged property by virtue of a decree
passed under an assent to the passing of a decree contained in the mortgage under the provisions of section 720 of this Article, the net proceeds of
sale, after the cost and expenses allowed by the court are satisfied, shall
not suffice to pay the mortgage debt and accrued interest, as the same
shall be found and determined by the Judgment of the court upon the
report of the auditor thereof, the court may, upon the motion of the plaintiff, the mortgagee or his legal or equitable assignee, after due notice, by
summons or otherwise, as the court may direct, enter a decree in personam
against the mortgagor or other party to the suit or proceeding, who is
liable for the payment thereof, for the amount of such deficiency; provided the mortgagee or his legal or equitable assignee would be entitled to
maintain an action at law upon the covenants contained in the mortgage
for said residue of said mortgage debt so remaining unpaid and unsatisfied by the proceeds of such sale or sales; which decree shall have the
same effect and be a lien as in a case of a judgment at law, and may be
enforced In like manner by a writ of execution in the nature of a writ of
fieri facias by attachment or otherwise."
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against anyone who signs it as mortgagor, even though
the one so signing as mortgagor has no interest in the property, 9 or, is the owner's wife who signs the mortgage as
an accommodation to her husband, 0 or, does not receive
the consideration which is paid to a friend of the mortgagor
and not to the mortgagor, 1 unless, of course, the signature
of the person so signing as mortgagor was procured by
fraud, false and fraudulent representations, duress or intimidation. 2 But fraud or deceit will not be a defense, if
the person signing the mortgage was able to read and write
the mortand could with reasonable diligence by reading
3
signing.'
was
he
what
discovered
have
gage
When there are several mortgagors, a mortgagee may
obtain a deficiency decree against all the mortgagors, and
if the mortgage contains a provision that it can be extended
on the request of any one of the mortgagors, the right is
not lost against all, when an extension of the mortgage is
granted at the request of only one.'"
There might be a question whether the one so signing
does so as a mortgagor or a guarantor, and if he signs as
a guarantor and not as a mortgagor, there is no right to
a deficiency decree against him.' 5
When the Mortgagor Has Assigned.
The rights of a mortgagee against a mortgagor, where
the mortgagor has assigned his equity of redemption to a
grantee, are ordinarily the same as where no assignment
has been made.'" Those rights are usually altered if there
is an agreement whereby the grantee assumes the mortgage debt and makes his promise to pay the debt to the
mortgagee. If there is such an assumption, the grantee then
I Kirsner v. Mortgage Co., 154 Md. 682, 141 Atl. 398 (1928).
10 Bletzer v. Cooksey, 154 Md. 568, 141 Atl. 380 (1928).
11 Golden v. Kovner Bldg. & Loan Assn., 156 Md. 167, 143 Atl. 708 (1928).
12 Central Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305 (1862) ; and cases cited In footnotes 9, 10 and 11.
211Ibid.
14 Kirsner v. Mortgage Co., 154 Md. 682, 141 At. 398 (1928).
15 Kushnick v. Bldg. & Loan Assn., 153 Md. 638, 139 Atl. 446 (1927);
Druid Hill, etc. v. Pumpian, Circuit Court of Baltimore City (O'Dunne, J.)
Daily Record, Nov. 1, 1935; See later discussion of rights against a guarantor.
1 Chilton v. Brooks, 72 Md. 554, 20 At. 125 (1890).
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becomes the principal debtor and the mortgagor surety. 17 If
such an assumption is followed by a course of conduct between the mortgagee and the grantee which changes the
mortgagor-surety's obligation, the mortgagor is thereby
released. 18 In other words, before a mortgagor is released
there must be first an assumption by the grantee of the
mortgage debt and then a change of the obligation without
the mortgagor 's consent.
The theory is that if the grantee is not personally liable
to the mortgagee to pay the mortgage debt, there is no relationship of principal and surety between the mortgagor
and grantee, and as that relationship does not exist, the
mortgagor is not discharged nor his liability for the mortgage debt affected by any indulgence as to time of payment given by the mortgagee to the grantee. It follows that
an extension of time for payment of the mortgage debt,
either of principal or of interest, given by the mortgagee
to the grantee is only considered a release of the mortgagor,
if the grantee has bound himself to the mortgagee to pay
the mortgage debt. The rights of the mortgagor against
his grantee, who has promised the mortgagor to pay the
debt, are not discussed in this article.1 9
It is pertinent to inquire first as to what facts will
amount to such an assumption. There may be a specific
assumption, or there may be acts of the parties amounting
to an assumption.20 Even though the grant of the mortgagor's interest to a grantee is made subject to the mortgage, it does not follow that the grantee thereby assumes
the mortgage debt, and so a relationship of principal and
surety as between the grantee and the mortgagor is not
necessarily created. In such case, the mortgagor would
1, Chilton v. Brooks, 72 Md. 554, 20 Atl. 125 (1890) ; George v. Andrews,
60 Md. 26 (1883).
18 Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 142 Atl. 598 (1928) ; Chilton v. Brooks,
72 Md. 554, 20 Atl. 125 (1890). Of course if there is a novation between the
mortgagee and grantee the mortgagor is released from all liability. Chatterly v. Safe Deposit, 168 Md. 656, 178 Atl. 854 (1935), or if the mortgagee
assents to the assignment and by a course of conduct estops himself from
looking to the mortgagor for payment, the mortgagor is released. East End
etc. v. Berman, 185 Atl. 332 (Md. 1936). In Penna. Ave. etc. v. Dubin, 165
Md. 555, 170 Atl. 169 (1933), the facts failed to establish such an estoppel.
19 Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 419, 142 Atl. 598 (1928).
21 See cases in note 18.
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not be discharged nor his liability affected, if the mortgagee should accept payments from the grantee at times
21
later than those specified in the mortgage.
However, when there has been a grant by the mortgagor,
it is presumed that the grantee assumed the mortgage debt,
if the amount of the mortgage debt is deducted from the
price paid the mortgagor by the grantee.2
If the grantee has assumed the mortgage debt, then
the relationship of principal and surety arises as between
the mortgagor and the grantee, with the mortgagor as the
surety and the grantee as the principal. Once such relationship has been established, then if the acts of the parties change the mortgagor-surety's obligation he is released
2 3
from liability on the mortgage debt.
This is on the theory that the extension changes the
mortgagor-surety's obligation and thereby releases him
from personal liability. This consequence could be avoided
by a distinct reservation by the mortgagee of his rights
against the mortgagor and of his rights to proceed with
foreclosure at the mortgagor's request,2 4 for if these reservations are made the mortgagor-surety's obligation has not
been changed.
In order that the extension of time to or change of
obligation of the grantee amounts to a release of the mortgagor, the act of the mortgagee must be supported by valid
consideration and be enforceable against him. 25 The merey
acceptance of payments by the mortgagee from the grantee
of less than the amounts due under the mortgage does not
in and of itself operate to create an extension, even though
the mortgagee does not notify the mortgagor of such deChilton v. Brooks, 72 Md. 554, 20 AtI. 125 (1890).
Chilton v. Brooks, 72 Md. 554, 20 AtI. 125 (1890) ; Shatterly v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Md. 656, 178 Atl. 854 (1935) ; East End Loan etc.
v. Berman, 185 Atl. 332 (Md. 1936) ; cf. Rosenthal v. Heft. 155 Md. 410, 142
Atl. 598 (1928) ; see Prodis v. Constantinides, 167 Md. 33, 172 AtI. 286, 93
A. L. R. 1200 (1934), and cases therein cited, 167 Md. 37.
23 Asbell v. Bldg. & Loan Asso., 156 Md. 106, 143 Atl. 715 (1928) ; George
v. Andrews, 60 Md. 26, (1883) and cases in note 22 herein.
24 George v. Andrews, 60 Md. 26 (1883).
2 Asbell v. Bldg. & Loan Asso., 156 Md. 106, 143 AtI. 715 (1928)
and
cases cited at 156 Md. 112; Warner v. Williams, 93 Md. 517, 49 Atl. 559
(1901) ; Berman v. Elm Loan Asso., 114 Md. 191, 78 Atl. 1104 (1910).
2
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fault.2" In other words, the mortgagee will retain his rights
against the mortgagor, even though he does not press all
his remedies, and he may extend to the grantee time for
payment of the mortgage debt, if, at the same time, he reserves the right to foreclose, if the mortgagor insists.
Since the relationship between the mortgagor and a
grantee, who has assumed payment of the mortgage debt,
is that of principal and surety, not that of principal and
agent or of joint obligors, payment of interest to the mortgagee by the grantee will not retard the running of the
statute of limitations in favor of the mortgagor."
When the Mortgage Is Not Under Seal
When the mortgage is not under seal the mortgagee,
not being entitled "to maintain an action at law upon the
covenants contained in the mortgage," is not entitled to
a deficiency decree under the above statutes providing for
28
that remedy.
However, there have been two statutes passed by the
legislature which might be considered to have varied the
law and to have given the mortgagee the same rights under
an unsealed mortgage which he formerly only had under
a sealed one. The statute validating mortgages otherwise
defective for want of sealing by the mortgagor first became law in 1904 and has been passed in every succeeding
2
legislature9.
The other statute passed by the legislature
30 Gross v. Bldg. & Loan Asso., 157 Md. 401, 146 Atl. 229 (1929) ; Golden
v. Kovner B. & L. Asso., 156 Md. 167, 143 Ati. 708 (1928) ; Warner v. Williams, 93 Md. 517, 49 AtI. 559 (1901) ; Berman v. Elm Loan Asso., 114 Md.
191, 78 Atl. 1104 (1910) ; Asbell v. Bldg. & Loan Asso., 156 Md. 108, 143
AtI. 715 (1928).
11 County Trust Co. v. Harrington, 168 Md. 101, 176 Atl. 639 (1934).
211 McDonald v. Building Asso., 60 Md. 589 (1883),
see Allen v. Sef, 160
Md. 240, 246, 153 Atl. 54 (1931).
This Statute has now been codified, Md. Code Supp., Art. 21, Sec. 87:
"All deeds, mortgages, releases, bonds or conveyances, bills of sale,
chattel mortgages and all other conveyances of real or personal property,
or of any interest therein or agreements relating thereto which may have
been executed, acknowledged or recorded in the State subsequent to the passage of the Act of the General Assembly of Maryland, passed at its January
Session, 1858, Chapter 208, which may not have been acknowledged according to the laws existing at the time of said acknowledgment, or
which may not have been acknowledged before a proper officer, or in which
the certificate of acknowledgment is not in the prescribed form, or in which
the official character of the officer taking the acknowledgment is not set out
in the body of the certificate, or has not been certified to as required by
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in 19180 abolished the distinction at law between the actions of assumpsit and covenant.
Since the passage of the first statute it has been law
that an unsealed mortgage is binding between the mortgagor and the mortgagee as if sealed"' regardless of the
fact that the rights of third parties may not have been affected by said statute.3 2 The statute validating mortgages
reads that the mortgage "shall be valid to all intents and
purposes as if sealed." This might be construed to mean
that an unsealed mortgage shall be treated as a sealed instrument, the mortgagee thereby being entitled to the same
rights in personam against the mortgagor that he would
have had if the mortgage had been under seal. This would
particularly seem to be so since the action of covenant has
been consolidated with the action of assumpsit. The one
law, or In which the conveyance has not been witnessed to or sealed as
required by law, or any deed heretofore made to or from a corporation
prior to the payment of bonus tax which was afterwards paid, shall be and
the same are hereby made valid, to all intents and purposes as if the
conveyances and agreements had been acknowledged, certified to, witnessed and sealed according to law; providing the said deeds, mortgages,
bonds of conveyances, bills of sale and other. conveyances and agreements
are In other respects in conformity with the laws; provided, further, that
nothing In this section shall affect the interest of bona fide purchasers or
creditors, without notice, who may have become so previous to June 1st,
1935."
so Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 4:
"In all actions em contractu there shall be no distinction In the pleadings by reason of the presence or absence of a seal upon any instrument
or writing involved in the case, except in so far as the presence or absence
of a seal may affect the substantive rights of the parties (such as necessity for a valuable consideration, period of limitation, etc.) as distinct
from matters of procedure; and counts for recovery upon sealed instruments may be joined with counts for recovery upon unsealed contracts,
express or implied; and there shall be but one form of action for recovery
upon any cause of action arising e-- contractu or quasi ex contractu,namely,
the action of assumpsit, in which It shall be sufficient for the plaintiff to
state briefly in his declaration the facts essential to recovery (but nothing
hereunder shall be construed as abolishing the use of the common counts).
Provided that no period of limitations now prescribed by law with respect
to any cause of action now existing or hereafter arising shall be altered
by this section. And in any such suit at law it shall be sufficient for the
defendant to file a general issue plea that the defendant never was indebted as alleged, or that the defendant never promised as alleged, under
either of which forms of plea all matters of defence and discharge shall
be admissible in evidence, except any matters which could only be availed
of by a special plea, or by a more express denial than such general issue
plea, in an action of assumpsit prior to the enactment of this section.
And the provisions of this section shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to
the pleadings when the defendant relies upon matter ex contractu In a
plea of set-off."
,1See McDivit v. MeDivit, 148 Md. 271, 129 At. 291 (1925).
52 See Wingert v. Ziegler, 91 Md. 318, 46 Ati. 1074
(1900).
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statute validates the mortgage as between the mortgagee
and mortgagor, and the other gives the mortgagee the
right to maintain an action at law to enforce the covenants
contained in the mortgage, and if the mortgagee has such
a right, then it would seem that he should be entitled to a
deficiency decree."
However, the right to a deficiency decree will not be
extended if any reasonable basis for the denial of that right
can be found, and since the statute validating unsealed
mortgages was passed primarily to cure defects in title, it
probably will not be construed to make an unsealed mortgage a sealed one for all purposes, but will be construed
to mean that an unsealed mortgage will be treated as if
sealed only in so far as title to real estate is affected,
thus leaving the parties to their other remedies in personam. The chances are that the law is unchanged in regard to rights in personam and a mortgage must be under
seal before the mortgagee will be entitled to obtain a deficiency decree against the mortgagor. 4
Even though the promise is not under seal the mortgagee still has the right to foreclose, and to bring an action of assumpsit against the mortgagor to collect the mortgage debt, as the mortgage is still valid as between the parties thereto. 5

RIGHTS AGAINST A GRANTEE OF THE MORTGAGOR

The mortgagee may have the right to collect the mortgage debt from the grantee. But before the mortgagee may
sue the grantee there must be a binding agreement between
the grantee and the mortgagee whereby the grantee agrees
11 See Note 8.

Allen v. Seff, 160 Md. 240, 153 Atl. 54 (1931). In this case a deficiency
decree was sought against the grantee and not against the mortgagor. The
reasoning of the court however leads to the belief that the law is still to
the effect that a deficiency decree may only be obtained when the mortgage is under seal.
85 Md. Code Supp., Art. 21, See. 33; Johnson v. Hines, 61 Md. 122, 138
(1883).
34
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to pay the mortgage debt.36 If such right exists, it may be
enforced either by an action in assumpsit or by a deficiency
decree. The method of enforcement depends on the way the
grantee has bound himself.
The mortgagee may secure a deficiency decree against
the grantee of the mortgagor, if the grantee has covenanted
7
under seal with the mortgagee to pay the mortgage debt.3
A promise to the mortgagor, even though under seal, is not
enough."' If the promise is not under seal then there is no
right to a deficiency decree.8 9
The mortgagee, however, is not without remedy against
the grantee for even though he is not entitled to a deficiency decree against him because the promise of the grantee to the mortgagee is not under seal he still may recover
40
in an action of assumpsit.
It must be remembered that the mere taking of a deed
by the grantee from the mortgagor in which it is recited
that the grantee takes subject to a mortgage, does not obligate the grantee to pay the mortgage debt. 1
Whether or not the grantee assumed the mortgage debt
is a question to be decided by the jury on the evidence. Evidence of payments by the grantee and of conversations between the grantee and the mortgagee, wherein the 'grantee
asked the mortgagee to withhold foreclosure proceedings for
a time, has been held to justify a finding that the grantee
had assumed the debt and a verdict for the mortgagee. 2
The Court in the Mashkes case 8 carried the doctrine that
a mortgagee is not entitled to a deficiency decree against
a grantee, who, by a covenant under seal, promised the
36 Mashkes v. Bldg. & Loan Asso., 167 Md. 270, 173 Atl. 54 (1934). The
mortgagee, however, may sue the grantee taking title on the covenant to
pay taxes, that being a covenant that runs with the land. Union Trust
Co. v. Rosenberg, et al., Daily Record. February 17, 1937 (Md. 1937).
37 Gross v. Bldg. & Loan Asso., 157 Md. 401, 146 Atl. 229 (1929); see
Allen v. Seff, 160 Md. 240, 153 Atl. 54 (1931).
e8 Seherr v. Building and Loan Asso., 166 Md. 106, 170 Atl. 197 (1934).
Cf. Mashkes v. Bldg. & Loan Asso., 167 Md. 270, 173 Atl. 54 (1934) and
Gable and Beacham v. Scarlett, 56 Md. 169 (1881).
"' Allen v. Seff, 160 Md. 240, 153 Atl. 54 (1931).
40 Safe Deposit, etc., v. Strauff, Daily Record, Jan. 27, 1937 (Md. 1937).
See Mashkes v. Building and Loan Asso., supra, note 38.
41 Cases supra note 37 and Mashkes v. Building and Loan Asso., supra,
note 38: Chilton v. Brooks. 72 Md. 554, 20 Atl. 125 (1890).
41 Mashkes v. Building and Loan Asso., supra, note 38.
Is Ibid.
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mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt considerably further
than seems proper. In that case, the Court (in passing
on a prayer of the plaintiff's) held that the mortgagee on
a like promise of the grantee could not even recover against
the grantee in an action of assumpsit.
It seems that the Court of Appeals has disregarded the
doctrine that a third party creditor-beneficiary may sue on
the promise made for his benefit. In the Scherr case44 the
Court on the authority of Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Knox Net & Twine Co.4" affirmed the doctrine that a
donee-beneficiary of a contract may sue the promisor
but held that that case was not applicable in the case of a
creditor-beneficiary unless the promise was made specifically
for the benefit of the creditor-beneficiary. Apparently in
both the Mashkes and Scherr cases the Court overlooked the
case of Small v. Schaeffer," which followed the famous case
of Lawrence v. Fox,47 in which it was held that a creditorbeneficiary was entitled to sue the promisor, although the
principle established by the Small case apparently has been
recently affirmed by the Court."
The following anomalous situation seems to be law. If
a mortgagor assigns to A, who promises the mortgagor to
pay the debt, and A assigns to B, who promises A to pay
the mortgage debt, the mortgagee may not sue A in assumpsit, as the promise of A is not for the mortgagee 's benefit.
But probably the mortgagee may sue B because as to him
he is a donee-beneficiary, and B's promise to A is considered as having been made for the mortgagee's benefit.
It is clear that the assignee is not bound in an action
of covenant, nor, under the statutory proceeding, for a deficiency decree, unless he makes a promise under seal to
the mortgagee to assume the covenants in the mortgage.
Likewise, under the Scherr and Mashkes cases, the mortgagee may not sue the grantee in assumpsit, unless the
"Scherr v. Building and Loan Asso., supra, note 38.
"150 Md. 40, 132 AtI. 261 (1926).
46 24 Md. 143 (1866).
"120 N. Y. 268 (1859).
18 Boulevard Corp. v. Stores Corp., 168 Md. 532, 537, 178 Atl. 707 (1935).
Restatement, Law of Contracts, Sec. 144, Illustration 2.
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grantee has promised the mortgagee to pay the mortgage
debt.
In a recent case the Court of Appeals applied ordinary
contract principles to determine what course of dealing between the mortgagee and grantee will be considered a promise by the grantee to pay the mortgage debt. 9
III
RIGHTS

AGAINST

A GUARANTOR

OF THE MORTGAGE

DEBT

A mortgagee may pursue the usual common law remedies against a guarantor of the mortgage debt, but he has
no right to get a decree in personam against such a guarantor, because that right is given by the statutes above
quoted, and the mortgagee may get a deficiency decree only
when he may sue the person against whom such decree is
sought, on the covenants contained in the mortgage. Even
though the guarantor signs as such on the mortgage itself,"0
still he is only liable on his contract of guarantee and not
on the covenants in the mortgage.
It is difficult to tell whether one signs as a guarantor of
a mortgage 1 or as a co-mortgagor to accommodate the
52
owner of the property.
It has been decided at Nisi Prius in Baltimore City that
oral evidence is admissible to prove that the parties sought
to be held by a motion for a deficiency decree signed as
guarantors and not as mortgagors, although in form the
signature appeared to be that of a co-mortgagor. 58
Of course, it might be that even though the signature
was that of a guarantor, which would mean that the mortgagee could not secure a deficiency decree against one so
signing, nevertheless suit could be brought by the mortgagee under the Speedy Judgment Act against the guarSafe Deposit, etc., v. Strauff, supra, note 40.
o Kushnick v. Building and Loan Asso., 153 Md. 638, 139 Ati. 446 (1927).
1
" Allen v. Seff, supra, note 39.
52 Kushnick v. Building and Loan Asso.,
supra note 50; Kirsner v. Mortgage Co., 154 Md. 682, 141 Atl. 398 (1928) ; Bletzer v. Cooksey, 154 Md. 568,
141 Atl. 380 (1928).
53 Druid Hill, etc., v. Pumpian, et al., Supra, note 15.
40

6
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antor with the mortgage attached to the declaration as the
cause of action. 4
Before proceeding against a guarantor, the mortgagee
probably must exhaust his remedies against the mortgagor,
but he is not bound to pursue these remedies against the
mortgagor the minute he becomes entitled thereto, in order
to continue to hold the guarantor. 5
Before a delay in going against the mortgagor will operate as a release of the guarantor, the mortgagee must
bind himself by an agreement with the mortgagor to postpone action against him and a mere delay or promise of delay, without consideration, is not sufficient to discharge the
guarantor. 6
IV
PROCEDURE IN PROCURING A DEFICIENCY DECREE

In an action for a deficiency decree, a mortgagor or his
grantee are proper parties. To bring them before the Court
there must be personal summons,5 7 but for this purpose
service need not be received until after the auditor has
58
filed his account in the foreclosure suit.
And the mortgagor or his grantor may not ordinarily
then raise a defense that he could have raised by excepting
either to the ratification of the foreclosure sale or to the
ratification of the auditor's account.5 9
" Ibid.
5 Golden v. Kovner B. & L. Asso., 156 Md. 167, 143 Atl. 708 (1928)
and cases cited at 156 Md. 177. Berman v. Elm Loan Asso., 114 Md. 191, 78
Atl. 1104 (1910).
50 Ibid.
11 McDonald v. Building Asso., 60 Md. 589 (1883).
"Gross v. B. & L. Asso., 157 Md. 401, 146 At. 229 (1929).
Allen v.
Seff, supra, note 39.
'" Bletzer v. Cooksey, supra note 52; Kirsner v. Mortgage Co., supra note
52. It may be that such defenses would be available to one who had no
knowledge of the foreclosure proceedings until he received a personal
summons after the ratification of the sale and the auditor's account when
the mortgagee has moved for a deficiency decree. If there were fraud in
the sale or the sale price were grossly inadequate, it would seem a travesty
of justice to hold that a person is precluded from setting up such defenses, before he had an opportunity of knowing about them.
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CONCLUSION

It, therefore, appears that in Maryland, under the statutes now in force a mortgagee may foreclose in any one of
the usual methods and may sue for a deficiency any one
who is bound to the mortgagee to pay the mortgage debt.
In order, however, to avail himself of the statutory remedy
of securing a deficiency decree, he must be sure that the one
against whom he is seeking to enforce that remedy, comes
within the strict wording of the statutes. In all other respects the rights of the mortgagee and their enforcement
are for the most part governed by the ordinary rules of
common law both as to substantive rights and as to procedure.

